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Governance within the Navajo Nation
Have Democratic Traditions Taken Hold?

David Wilkins

his essay crafts a description and analysis of the political and in

stitutional context, structures, and issues of the Navajo Nation's g

ernment. We begin with a demographic, institutional, and ideolog

assessment of the nation as it currently stands, move to a histori
overview of the nation from precontact times to the 1989 riots,

conclude with a short policy portfolio of three issues-land clai

gaming, and taxation-that will likely impact the shape and direct
the nation will head into the twenty-first century.

The Navajo Reservation is a vast, rugged, and beautiful land. Fir

delineated in the 1868 treaty, it has nearly quadrupled in size sin

then through some twenty-five additions. Today, the Dine land b

some 25,351 square miles (nearly 18 million acres), encompas
large portion of northeastern Arizona, a part of northwester

Mexico, and some 1,900 square miles in southeastern Utah. Interes

ingly, the Navajo Nation also includes three satellite (geograph
separate) Navajo communities-Canoncito, Alamo, and Ramahin western New Mexico-and completely encircles two other
the Hopi nation and the San Juan Paiute.

The Navajo Reservation represents 36 percent of all Indian land

in the continental United States.' This tremendous stretch of land
largest of the 278 Indian reservations in the country, is slightly

than the state of West Virginia. Nearly 15 million acres of Navajo t
al land is held in trust2 by the federal government.
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Preliminary analysis of the 2000 U.S. census data estimated that
there are 250,000 Navajos living in the United States. Of this total, an

estimated 180,000 live within the reservation proper (including the

Eastern Navajo Checkerboard area). This population, the largest of
any single tribe except for the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, which
now claims to have 369,035 members, has nearly doubled in the last
twenty years and continues to grow at an astounding rate. About onethird of all Navajos living within the reservation are less than sixteen
years old, and the median age is 18.8 years.
Unlike many other reservations, which were allotted and opened
for white homesteaders, allotment was never widely implemented on
the Navajo Nation, and therefore the number of non-Indians and non-

Navajo Indians remains quite small. According to the 1990 U.S. census, over 90 percent of the reservation population was Navajo. Although

the Navajo population continues to grow rapidly, economic statistics
are not nearly as encouraging. While per capita income for AngloAmericans is $15,252, it is only $6,651 for Navajos. More than 56 percent of Navajos live below the poverty line, while only 15.7 percent of

Arizonans are below that depressing threshold. The Navajo Nation in
1996 had a total labor force of 50,857. However, the unemployment
rate in that year was 44.61 percent. This figure usually fluctuates be-

tween 38 and 50 percent depending on the season. Equally disheartening is the reality that while the total personal income of Navajos
was over $1 billion for 1996, less than $300 million was actually spent
within the reservation's borders, a leakage of over 76 percent to off-

reservation communities who benefit from the purchasing power of
Navajo shoppers.3
Politically, Navajos have been fairly active in tribal elections. For

example, more than 93,000 Navajos were registered to vote in 1998,
although only 42 percent of the registered voters actually participated
in the fall presidential primary. This low turnout appears to reflect the

disenchantment many Navajos feel with the ethical problems of sever-

al of their recent presidents.

> Of the five agencies-Western Navajo, Chinle, Fort Defiance,
Shiprock, and Eastern Navajo-Fort Defiance has the largest number
V of registered voters: 24,569 as of 1998. There is also evidence that
more Navajos participate in federal, state, and local elections when a
candidate's stand on issues of importance to Navajos is evident.4 His92 3 torically, Navajo voting patterns in tribal elections have been better
than the voting percentages of Americans, whose turnout in American
? presidential elections ranks at the bottom of voting rates for twentyseven countries with competitive elections. In 1992, for example, the
non-Indian turnout rate for the presidential race was only 55 percent.
This percentage actually represented a sharp rise from the previous
four decades of presidential voting.5
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The Navajo Nation Council currently consists of eighty-eight
delegates, although a recent tribal referendum (September 5, 2000), if

successful, would have reduced the size of the council from eightyeight to twenty-four delegates.6 The final vote was 22,016 in favor of

reducing the council to 9,319 opposed, but the referendum failed because it required 50 percent plus one of the total number of registered
voters to cast a "yes" vote. The official number of registered voters on
the reservation at the time of the election was 92,261; thus, 46,131 votes

in favor were needed in order for the referendum to be approved.

The council is led by the speaker of the council, who is the pre-

siding officer of the council. Although the Secretary of the Interior

continues to wield veto power over certain council decisions, the
Navajo political system, with the Title II changes in the executive
branch in 1989, has more comparability than ever before to state governments and the federal government.

Many Navajos, however, believe that it is in their best interest
to adhere to and enhance what is most distinctive about the Navajo
people, especially in the areas of cultural retention and values specific

to the Dine, and most important, to retain and invigorate the Navajo
language. Otherwise, there is a sense that the nation might face a permanent and irreversible identity crisis. In fact, for some Navajos, this is

the lesson of the appearance and destructive force of the hantavirus in

1993 and the reported appearance of two Navajo deities to an elderly
woman in 1996 warning the people to revive traditional values and beliefs or face severe consequences.

Navajos also understand that sovereignty and self-government
imply a necessity and the inclination to negotiate appropriate agreements with surrounding states, other tribes, and the federal government. A good example of this is the sovereignty accord signed in 1992

between President Peterson Zah and the governors of New Mexico,
Utah, and Arizona. This policy declared that the interactions of the
four sovereigns would "be predicated on a government-to-government
relationship" and that all future relations would be "carried forward in a

spirit of cooperation, coordination, communication, and good will."7 >

The Navajo Nation operates one of the most complex political
systems in Indian Country. The nation, unlike some other tribal governments, generally approaches the negotiating table with a political-

ly united front, although the events surrounding Peter MacDonald's
last days in office in the late 1980s threatened that relative political 3 93
homogeneity for a brief but intense period of time. This is not meant

to imply that Navajo citizens are always in agreement with the leg- ?
islative, executive, or judicial decisions of their policy makers, but
rather points out that the intense intratribal conflicts that have recent-

ly hampered the self-determination efforts of tribes like the Cherokee

of Oklahoma, the Tohono O'odham of southern Arizona, the Lumbee
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of North Carolina, and others, are not a major or persistent problem
for the Navajos.
In a sense, the political cohesiveness of the Navajo people can be
viewed positively. It means that the Navajo Nation Council is the rec-

ognized voice of all Navajos, although there are always exceptions
(e.g., at present, the Navajos living around Big Mountain may hold a
contrary view). Generally, political divisiveness does not threaten the
integrity of Navajo national government.

On the other hand, the absence of a politically active traditional
government segment implies that a great deal of Navajo tradition has
already been displaced. This loss has been more pronounced in the ex-

ecutive and legislative branches. The judicial branch, conversely, has
shown a greater willingness to integrate traditional Navajo legal and
social values into the already established Western legal system that is
generally operative throughout the reservation.

For instance, in 1982, Navajo judges implemented Peacemaker
Courts, which utilize traditional Navajo dispute resolution techniques
to resolve local disputes.8 Additionally, the courts of the Navajo Nation

have gone even further and in 1991 adopted a new code of judicial
conduct. This code uses many principles of the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, but it also incorporates a number of uniquely Navajo legal values as well.9

The Navajo people have witnessed the executive and legislative
branches of their government, and the judicial to a lesser extent, assume the functions, the institutions, the technologies, the politics, and

in some respects, even the goals of the larger society. Some Navajos
feel it is not now possible, or even advisable, to reverse this trend and
argue that a revival of traditional Dine structures of governance would
disrupt existing internal and external working relationships already in
place (i.e., within the tribe, and between the states and federal govern-

ment). On the other hand, some of the traditional Navajo population
and an increasing number of younger Navajos fear that, unless im-

mediate steps are taken to reintroduce even more traditional Navajo
concepts and structures beyond those already in place in the judicial
branch, the qualities that distinguish Navajos from other tribes and
racial/ethnic groups may be lost forever.

James Q. Wilson, a noted political scientist, has stated that "judg-

ments about institutions and interests can only be made after one has

94 I seen how they behave on a variety of important issues or potential issues."'0 In this regard, Navajo national government, as presently constituted, is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, members of the nation's

council, the judicial system, the executive branch, and the growing
tribal bureaucracy are part of a very old society with roots going back
hundreds of generations.
Navajo citizens, like citizens of the larger society, tend to assume
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that the way decisions are made now are the only way decisions can
be made. In fact, there are many other ways to operate government

based on popular consensus. Navajo traditions, history, and beliefs
weigh heavily, whether consciously or not, on what is decided by tribal leaders.
DINt TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT

From a Western European political perspective, t

nonexistent as a representative political body

Navajo people were, of course, cohesive in that t

linguistic and cultural heritage, lived within a w

and referred to themselves as Dine. But their pol

general, did not extend beyond local bands th

men, or naataanii. We will soon discuss a political

gathering known as the Naachid that did, in fact

alized sphere of influence, but it is important to

this body had no coercive powers and apparently

Navajos. To put it another way, before the arriva

the nineteenth century, the Navajo people did wit

resentative government that resembled the gover

States or Western European countries.

The Naataanii (Headmen and Headwomen
of Traditional Society)
The Navajo origin story contains the first specific reference to individu-

als regarded as leaders by Dine. These first naataanii were selected by

the Diyin Dine (Holy People) to provide discipline to the people of
the Third World. According to the story and contemporary oral accounts, as interpreted by Richard Van Valkenburgh, "[The] function of

these leaders . . . was directed toward the correction of behavior, the

maintenance of certain moral injunctions, such as the prohibition of
incest and adultery, as well as the enforcement of economic laws." The
naataanii also served as intermediaries between the Dine and the Diyin
Dine. When the Spanish arrived in the late 1500s, the fundamental political entity in Navajo society was the natural community. This collec-

tive unit of government was basically economic in nature, geographi-

cally determined, and was distinct from other local units. Population 95
figures for these communities vary, but the most informed accounts es-

timate that a natural community contained from ten to forty families.

Each of these settlements was directed by a naataanii, who received ad-

vice and counsel from hastoi and hataali.1 Internal matters, intertribal
affairs, hunting, and food gathering were issues regularly addressed by

this deliberative body of leaders.
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The Navajo people recognized, as did other indigenous nations
like the Cherokee and the Creek, the importance of having separate
war and peace leaders for the successful functioning of tribal harmony.

Seldom did one person fill both offices. To attain the position of a war

naataanii, an individual needed extensive knowledge of one or more of

the War Ways. Anyone who had acquired this ritual knowledge was
eligible to serve as a war leader. These were ceremonies designed to
bring about successful raids or counterraids against outside forces. The

Navajo attitude toward war leaders, according to Hill, was equivocal.
That is to say, while these individuals were respected as great fighters,

they were also frequently criticized. It was believed by some Navajo
that war leaders were largely responsible for the defeat and imprison-

ment of Navajo at Bosque Redondo in the 1860s.12
A peace naataanii, by contrast, was chosen or elected if he or she

had knowledge of the Blessing Way ceremony, and only if he or she
had excellent moral character, great oratorical abilities, and charisma.

The individual also had to possess the ability to serve in both the sacred and day-to-day aspects of Navajo life and culture. In effect, the
selection of a naataanii followed a democratic process involving the
adult population of a natural community.

Once selected, naataanii were put through an initiation cere-

mony during which the leader's lips were coated with corn pollen
taken from the four sacred mountains. This action was meant to enable

the leader to give powerful speeches. At such an occasion songs were

sung and sacred tobacco, also brought from the sacred peaks, was
smoked by distinguished individuals.13

The peace naataanii was not a hereditary position. However,
once in office, the individual usually remained for life. These persons,
before their death, were expected to step down and identify a succes-

sor, although the community could decide not to accept the recommendation. There is evidence that women were occasionally selected
for this important position. The peace leader oversaw the economic
development of the community, arbitrated family disputes, dealt with
> witchcraft issues, and served as the diplomatic representative between
their natural outfit and other local communities, tribes, and later with
0

the Spanish, Mexican, and American governments. Neither a peace
nor a war naataanii, it is important to remember, had coercive powers,
and his or her effectiveness depended almost entirely upon the quality

96 of their personal character.
0

0

THE

NAACHID

z

Q Based largely on oral accounts, there is strong evidenc

existence of a periodic tribal assembly. This regional g

and war leaders was called a Naachid, literally meaning

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 22 Oct 2019 16:31:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

the hand." The most detailed written account of a Naachid (the last
one was reportedly held in the 1850s or 1860s) comes from the writings of Richard Van Valkenburgh. He noted that the assembly was
called "at two and four year intervals and, should a tribal emergency
arise, could be called in an odd year." Twenty-four leaders-twelve war

and twelve peace (some sources claim that there were six of each)would meet in a specially constructed hogan. Valkenburgh noted that
at a prescribed time during the assembly, a four-day dance was conducted. After the dance, a succession of meetings and dances was held
throughout the winter, with the assembly adjourning after the spring
planting.

The Naachid was held for several purposes. Ceremonially, it was

conducted to insure an abundance of water and soil fertility. It also
served at times as a war council or a peace council. For example, it was

reported in December 1840 that "Navajos held a Naachid ceremony
west of Canyon de Chelly for the purpose of making peace with the
Mexicans. On this date, Jose Andres Sandoval, justice atJemez, report-

ed to the governor: 'At nightfall of this day [December 14] a Navajo
known as Anceluno presented himself in this pueblo [Jemez] soliciting
peace in the name of his nation.'""4

During peaceful years, the peace naataanii chaired the assembly.

However, when war or other outside threats arose, the war naataanii
had the proceedings. Women played an active role in the Naachid, and

could speak openly to the gathered delegates if they had participated
in raids or had achieved prominent status through some other means.

The decisions of the Naachid were not binding on the assembled
Navajos (and certainly not on any outfits not present), and those who

disagreed with the gathering's decisions were not compelled to obey
and suffered no reprisals.

Throughout the millennia when the Naachid was active, it played

a number of vital roles. When war began, many Navajo could gather
quickly. Although natural community leaders exercised considerable

regional influence, a political regrouping occurred when the Naachid
convened. Speakers at the assembly were not chosen by formal votes; >
instead, the general assembly's informal approval and acknowledgment
were required. Some accounts stress that the Naachid's primary role was

ceremonial in nature and that it functioned politically only when out-

side threats compelled the assembled Navajo to act as a political unit.
97

DINt GOVERNMENT, 1700-1846

Despite Spanish intrusion into Navajo country by

and continuing through the early 1800s, traditional N
ing structures remained intact. Although the Navajo

gradually shifted west, largely because of Spanish, Ute
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incursions, the natural communities, the naataanii, and the Naachid

continued to serve as the basic Navajo political units. There is evidence that during the Spanish period five loose Navajo political sub-

divisions coalesced. These were located at Mount Taylor, Cebolleta,
Chuska, Bear Springs, and Canyon de Chelly.

The Spanish, meanwhile, continued to carefully "select" those
Navajo leaders who would best serve them as political and military al-

lies. For example, the Navajo headman Don Carlos was chosen and
anointed by the Spanish as the "Navajo General" of the entire nation. But

when he proved to be ineffective, according to the Spanish officials, he
was removed from office and replaced by Antonio el Pinto. The Spanish

governor de la Concha wrote this glowing, if questionable, description
of el Pinto and described his alleged authority over all Navajos:

[A]n Indian of extraordinary talent, and one whom the
whole nation respects and obeys in the manner which is

customary to civilized nations with an authorized commander. These qualities are rare in a class of people who
are led along the path of reason by only profit or fear and

this is recognized by his own people, which causes them
to venerate him.15

There were other occasions when the Spanish attempted to "designate" Navajo individuals and declare them the head of all the nation.
In fact, Spanish diplomatic and military efforts to firm up their position

in New Mexico by exploiting one group of Navajos against others led
to a long-lasting schism between the Navajo in the early part of the
nineteenth century that lasts to this day.

The separation began in 1818 when a Navajo headman, Joaquin,
visited the Spaniards in the Jemez Pueblo. Joaquin told the Spanish of-

ficials that despite his efforts to maintain peace, other Navajos were
preparing for war because they were angry at Spanish encroachments
on their lands. Joaquin, frustrated at what he considered the more mili-

tant attitude of western Navajo, had physically relocated his own people
closer to the Spanish settlements and went as far as severing connec-

tions with the rest of the Dine people. This action placed Joaquin's
small band into the role of "being traitors to the main Navajo tribe and
subservient to the government at Santa Fe. From this time forward,

98 Joaquin's small group would be referred to as the Dine Ana'i or Enemy
Navajos."16
Schemes to fabricate a central Navajo political figurehead were
also employed at various times by the Mexican and U.S. governments.

The anointed "Navajo Generals," however, never represented more
than a handful of Navajo families despite the contentions or grandiose
terms applied to them by the Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. governments.
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DINt GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE DURING

THE EARLY AMERICAN PERIOD, 1846-1921

When the United States replaced the Mexican go

dominant foreign influence in the Southwest in 1846

ately faced with the task of trying to establish peace

the independent and powerful Navajos, the various

and many other tribes. This Herculean task was comp

centralized Navajo political structure and by the ensla

number of Navajo women and children being held in
Mexicans.

The U.S. military and government officials, despite some seventy years of experience in dealing with tribal nations, naively believed

that a treaty signed by a few Navajo headmen would bind the entire
nation. Thus, the American government, like the two preceding nations, equated Navajo political and social structures with those of the
federal and European political systems.

Between 1846 and 1868, the Navajo signed nine separate treaties
with the United States. The first took place in the fall of 1846 when the

U.S. Army and over five hundred Navajos, led by fourteen headmen,
signed a treaty of peace at Ojo del Oso (Fort Wingate, New Mexico).
Navajo raids continued, however, reflecting the decentralized political
reality of Navajo tribal existence. This treaty, like those of 1848, 1851,

1855, two in 1858, and 1861, was not ratified by the U.S. Senate. Only
the 1849 and 1868 treaties were ratified. The early nonratified treaties

usually included provisions regarding the establishment of peace, the
regulation of commerce, the exchange of prisoners, and the return of
stolen property. The later ones focused more on peace and clarification
of Navajo territorial boundaries.

Sometime before 1858, the Naachid apparently ceased to function. American military campaigns and the hardships of widespread
disbursement of the Navajo people severely inhibited gatherings of

this tribal assembly. The Long Walk to Fort Sumner and the subsequent four-year confinement of Navajos at Bosque Redondo from 1864 >
to 1868 worked against the practice of keeping the Naachid function-

al. The evidence suggests that the Naachid was never again reconstituted because most of the older Navajos who knew how to conduct it

had died during their oppressive years of imprisonment.
With the Naachid permanently broken, the Navajos turned to 3 99
individual naataanii for direction and leadership. General Carleton, the
mastermind behind the devastating Fort Sumner experience, had actually planned in the early stages of preparing the fort to further break

the Navajo natural leadership by subdividing the Navajo population
(more than eight thousand) into twelve villages, to be situated half a
mile apart. Each village was to have a chief or headman, appointed by
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the military officer in charge, and one subchief for every one hundred

Navajos. Carleton's "political organization" plan for the nation was
never implemented, however, because Navajos preferred to live in their
extended families and small bands and did not want to live in close

proximity with the Mescalero Apache, their enemies, who were also
confined at the fort.

When the Navajos were released from Fort Sumner, they recognized a need to reconstitute themselves, politically, socially, and ceremonially. Oral accounts relate that sometime during the fall of 1868,

the people, led by their peace naataanii and medicine men, assembled
in Window Rock to perform a Blessing Way ceremony. For seven days,
thirteen leaders and medicine men fasted and prayed, seeking spiritual

guidance and protection. During the ceremony "Sacred Mountain Dirt
Bundles" (dzil leezh) were tied together, and each of the leaders received

a bundle. When the ceremony concluded, each of the leaders was instructed by the medicine man to carry his personal bundle through
Window Rock four times. After this, the people dispersed to the four
directions to begin their lives anew.

For a period, the Indian agent accepted those Navajo who had
emerged from Fort Sumner as the recognized political leadership of
the nation, including Barboncito, Ganado Mucho, Delgadito, Narbona,

and Mariano. By the early 1880s, the Navajo Indian agent told the
Secretary of the Interior that there were four major settlements of
Navajos, each under the control of a chief or chiefs: North of Agency,

led by Chief Francisco Capitan (population 4,000); East of Agency,
Chief Manuelito (population 4,000); South of Agency, Chiefs Mariano
and Tsi'naajini Biye' (population 4,000); and West of Agency, led by

Head Chief Ganado Mucho (population 4,000).17
Gradually, as these leaders died, and with federal policy shifting
toward a more coercive form of assimilation, the Navajo Indian agent

began acting in a more autocratic fashion. From 1878 to 1910, the
"Head Chiefs" of the Navajo people were "appointed" by the Navajo

3 Indian agent and were confirmed by the Secretary of the Interior.
> Manuelito, who had been appointed in 1870, served until 1884 when
the Indian agent replaced him with Henry Chee Dodge, a bilingual,
mixed-blood Navajo.
Besides the head chiefs, regional naataanii, also selected by the
agent, continued to guide their communities. There were an estimated

100 3 thirty local headmen functioning throughout the reservation in 1900.
The Indian agent annually assembled the head chief and regional lead? ers to discuss important issues. Clearly, the Navajo Indian agent, living
at Fort Defiance by this time, wielded an extreme amount of authority.

Valkenburgh pointed out that "agents-deliberately smashed all native
power, and those naat'aanih who refused to 'play ball,' lost all govern-
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ment recognition and, without that, soon lost influence over the
people in that region."
Although the agent selected and directed these "Agency Chiefs,"
Mary Shepardson reported that there remained "the old informal lead-

ers, local headmen, wealthy stock-owners, ceremonial practitioners,
and heads of large family groups [who] constituted the defacto leadership of the localities."

By 1900 the Navajo Reservation had nearly quadrupled in size
through executive order extensions, and it was evident that a single
federal agent could no longer oversee the affairs of such a greatly ex-

panded land base. Moreover, the population had doubled and then
stood at nearly 15,000. Thus, to regain a better administrative position, Navajo territory was divided into six separate agency jurisdictions, each with their own superintendent, between 1901 and 1934. This

included an agency for the Hopi Tribe that also served Navajos. The
agencies were the Western Navajo at Tuba City; the San Juan Agency
at Shiprock; the Navajo Agency at Fort Defiance; the Pueblo Bonito at

Crownpoint, New Mexico; the Leupp Agency at Leupp; and the Hopi
at Keams Canyon.
According to Robert Young, the subdivision of the reservation
into six separate units, combined with an increase in staff and a smaller

land area, "led to the abandonment of the previous system of appoin-

tive chiefs .... By 1910 the use of appointive chiefs was abandoned
completely."18
THE FIRST NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL

As noted above, there was no Navajo natio

1920s except for the brief if coerced cohe

Sumner incarceration. But when oil was

portion of the reservation in 1922, the fed

the semblance of a central Navajo governi

Washington might interact in providing l

ment. Prior to this, interested energy

agency superintendent, who then convened

Navajos in that agency to consider the com

But as Lawrence Kelly noted, "the obvious

councils were to be subordinate to the gov

Navajos "were not members of any de
in existence prior to that time."

Oil and gas companies, anxious to exp

wealth of the reservation, pressured the De

agency superintendents to convene additio
both the San Juan (Shiprock) and Southern Navajo (Fort Defiance)
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agencies. And although several new leases were granted by the Navajos
to the companies, most were rejected.
Rebuffed, the oil companies then exerted more pressure on the
Interior Department and the commissioner of Indian Affairs (CIA) to
take away the inherent leasing power of the Navajos and place it in the

hands of a federal representative. The Navajos, however, refused to
surrender their right to lease their lands.

Two developments in the fall of 1922 signaled an end to the leas-

ing stalemate. First, the Interior Department changed its policy and
now asserted that oil and gas royalties, bonuses, and rentals derived
from discoveries in any part of the reservation belonged to the Navajo

Tribe as a whole, and not "exclusively to those Navajo residents in
whose jurisdiction it was found." Second, this policy change resulted in

the Interior's creation of a "business council" that was initially com-

posed of three Navajos authorized to deal with lease grants: Henry
Chee Dodge, Charlie Mitchell, and Daagha'chii Bikiss. These men were
apparently selected by the Secretary of the Interior. However, the legality of this nonrepresentative and nonelected body was immediately

questioned because it utterly failed to meet the 1868 treaty requirement of securing the approval of three-fourths of the adult males when

any transactions involving Navajo lands occur.
A more representative council had to be devised. Albert Fall, the
Secretary of the Interior, on January 3, 1923, proceeded to contact Mr.

Herbert J. Hagerman, former territorial governor of New Mexico, and

offered him the position of "Special Commissioner to Negotiate with
Indians." Hagerman accepted the appointment as commissioner to the
Navajos, and was granted general authority over the five Navajo agencies. On January 23, the CIA Charles Burke issued a document entitled
"Regulations Related to the Navajo Tribe of Indians," which the Navajos

had not seen. This document established procedures to create the first

Navajo Tribal Council. The council was to consist of one delegate and
one alternate from each agency, plus a chair and vice chair. This body

was touted as an organization "with which administrative officers of
the Government may directly deal in all matters affecting the tribe."

The chair of the council was to be elected by the council delegates at
the first meeting and was to be selected from the tribal membership
at large. Apparently, once chosen, the chair and vice chair could have
held office indefinitely since no fixed terms were specified. The chair

102 P also functioned as a council member as well as the presiding officer following his election. The vice chair was to be selected from the council's own membership.
If an agency failed to elect a delegate to the council within thirty

days, the Secretary of the Interior would fill the position with his own

appointment. Furthermore, the tribal council could not meet without

the commissioner's presence. And interestingly enough, the Interior
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Department reserved the right to remove any council member upon
proper cause. The document contained no statement of legislative or
other formal powers. The council was to serve primarily as a consultative group, though it did have power to consent to leases.

Once these regulations reached the Navajos, they attacked the
removal power of the Secretary of the Interior and objected to the
number of delegates and alternates representing each agency. Subsequent to these objections, the regulations were rewritten on April 24.

The new laws excluded the removal clause and provided for a forum,
interpreters, and a means of succession in the event that the chair or

vice chair positions became vacated. Finally, the number of delegates
and alternates to the council was increased from twelve to twenty-four.

In other words, there were to be twelve voting delegates and twelve
nonvoting alternates.
The Secretary of the Interior, nevertheless, maintained tremen-

dous authority over the tribal council. He could make appointments
when the Navajos refused to do so in a given period of time; meetings
could be held only in the presence of a federal representative; and the

council could convene only at the discretion of the commissioner of
the tribe, who was solely responsible for calling the meetings.

The newly elected councilmen held their first meeting at Toad-

lena, New Mexico, on July 7, 1923. The council elected Chee Dodge
as chair, but for some reason failed to elect a vice chair. Then they

unanimously approved a resolution-drafted in Washington-which
gave Commissioner Hagerman the authority to sign all oil and gas
leases "on behalf of the Navajo Indians." In effect, their first action es-

sentially eliminated the principal reason the council was organized,
which had been to approve leases on behalf of their people. According
to Lawrence Kelly, the council apparently agreed to this resolution because they believed that they "would receive government aid in secur-

ing new lands." The council would not regain this important power
until 1933.

The tribal council met annually, usually for two days, and gener-

ally functioned as little more than an "advisor" to Commissioner >
Hagerman during the next decade of its existence. The council was
largely a creature of the Secretary of the Interior and certainly not an

organization exercising powers of self-government. In April 1927, the

council's regulations were amended to allow council members and executive officers to serve five-year terms, instead of four. The following ? 103
year, October 15, 1928, a third set of regulations was issued by the
CIA. These included provisions that gave women the right to vote, authorized the CIA instead of the commissioner of the Navajo Tribe to
call meetings, and reestablished the term of office at four years.

There were but two other major changes in the regulations before tribal reorganization began in 1936. On October 3, 1933, under

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 22 Oct 2019 16:31:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Tom Dodge's chairmanship (Chee Dodge's son), the tribal council, in
an act of sovereignty, "revoked" and "canceled" the power of attorney it

had ceded to the federal government at the council's first meeting in

1923. The council also became more outspoken in the kinds of issues
it would concern itself with, including chapter organization, employment, education, water projects, tribal resources, health, education, and
livestock issues.'9

On July 10, 1934 the council unanimously voted to give council
alternates the right to vote as full-fledged delegates. The tribal council

now had twenty-four functioning members and was adamant about
issues that other governments concern themselves with.
NAVAJO TRIBAL REORGANIZATION,
1936-1938

The subject of Navajo tribal government

twined and affected by the quality and e

cycles, the personalities of certain triba

development projects like the Hoover (a

of course, livestock. The Navajo subsis

danger by 1930 as evidenced by the W

forester for the BIA who, in a detailed re

range, reported that 1.3 million sheep a

than 12 million acres of land. Such large

and cattle were not included in his da
to the land. But Zeh did not recommend massive livestock reduc-

tion. Instead, he called for the reservation to be expanded, urged the
elimination of excess horses, and suggested improved breeds of sheep

and goats. He only recommended a gradual reduction in the number
of goats.20

In fact, the winters of 1931-32 and 1932-33 were particularly
harsh, and thousands of sheep and goats starved, reducing the number

of sheep and goats. Simultaneously, Congress authorized the Colorado

> River Project, whose main cog was Hoover Dam. When completed,
the dam created a 150-mile-long lake that protected much of Southern
0

California, created an improved irrigation system, and generated elec-

N tricity for the Southwest.

v But within a few years, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that
104 3 silt from the San Juan and the Little Colorado Rivers, which course
through the Navajo Reservation, would eventually pile up behind the
? dam and make it useless within a few years. In effect, the Hoover Dam

was the catalyst for the drastic livestock reduction that would then
ensue. According to White, the government "misunderstood the erosion cycle and its causes and blamed it largely on Navajo lands" and
acted more to benefit economic development in the Southwest than to
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protect Navajos.2' Ultimately, Navajo herds were dramatically reduced
from 1,053,498 sheep units in 1933 to 449,000 in 1946 when active re-

duction was stopped.
In effect, the stock reduction program served as the impetus by

which the Navajo people came to see that the decisions of their government, the Navajo Tribal Council, for good or ill had real import for

their lives and pocketbooks. CIA John Collier convinced the tribal
council to approve and participate in the livestock reduction program

with promises that if it did new lands would be added to the reservation in Arizona and New Mexico. Although some lands were added
to the Western Navajo Agency, the promised lands were not forthcoming in New Mexico due to powerful non-Indian interests in the
state. Gradually, the Navajo people lost what little faith they still had
in the tribal council.
The council, for its part, was in a profound dilemma. The need for

some livestock reduction appeared a reasonable request, and the opportunity to gain additional lands if they did was an important impetus to

accept the government's reduction plan. But the council was already
feeling pressure from the people that the program was not fair and was

leaving many Navajo families destitute. On the other hand, if they had

not supported Collier and his soil conservation program, it was clear
that the government would carry out stock reduction anyway.

The Navajo Tribe, like most other tribes, was given an opportunity to establish a constitutional form of government in 1934 under the

auspices of the Indian Reorganization Act. This major law was the
brainchild of CIA John Collier, and it gave tribes a two-year period
to vote on whether they wished to adopt or reject the act's provisions.
For many reasons, not the least of which was the government's forced

reduction of Navajo livestock, the Navajo people narrowly rejected
the act, by a vote of 8,197 to 7,679. Collier was deeply hurt by the
Navajos' rejection of his measure. But he continued to express a need
for an overhaul of Navajo government. And as already noted, many
Navajos now viewed the tribal council with disdain, believing that it
had aided and supported the federal government's stock reduction program and did not truly represent the views of the Navajo people.

The last meeting of the original tribal council was held November 24, 1936, under acting chairman Marcus Kanuho.22 Jacob C.
Morgan, the Shiprock council delegate, and the most outspoken oppo-

nent of stock reduction, protested the impending breakup of the old 105
tribal council. Nevertheless, during this last meeting the council estab-

lished an executive committee charged with calling a constitutional assembly for the purpose of writing and adopting a tribal constitution.

This executive committee, led by Chee Dodge, Marcus Kanuho,

Henry Taliman, and Father Bernard Haile, toured the reservation
throughout the winter, and by February 1937 had a working list of 250
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nominees for the constitutional assembly. The executive committee ul-

timately pared this number down to seventy. When the seventy delegates met that spring, their principle objective was to appoint a com-

mittee to draft a constitution. Once written, it would be sent to the
Interior Department for approval and then sent back to the council and
tribal members for ratification.

The constitution was completed later that year. The proposed

organic act mirrored those of tribes who had accepted the Indian
Reorganization Act's provisions. It laid out the membership requirements and created a council as the legislative body. It was to be composed of seventy-four delegates, apportioned at the rate of one for
every six hundred Navajos. It spelled out eligibility criteria for council

members and provided for six-year terms of office. The executive
branch was to consist of a president and vice president, who would also
serve six-year terms. Importantly, the constitution outlined and delim-

ited the council's powers. These included, but were not limited to, the
regulation, use, and distribution of tribal property; the regulation of
trade; the levying of taxes; the establishment of inheritance laws; and
the hiring of legal counsel.

The constitution also contained a clause, common for that time,

which declared that "any resolution or ordinance adopted by the
Navajo Council or Executive Committee shall take effect as soon as approved by the Secretary of the Interior."23 In other words, all the tribes'

decisions, had the constitution been adopted, would have had to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior. For a number of complicated

reasons,24 including the fact that Morgan and his associates had become so vehement in their opposition to the constitutional process, the
Secretary of the Interior, fearing a permanent political split in the tribe

and more hostility to the stock-reduction program, rejected the consti-

tution. Instead, the BIA gave the assembly delegates the option of de-

claring themselves to be the new tribal council. The delegates voted
themselves into office, and later in 1938 the Secretary of the Interior

issued a simplified set of bylaws called "Rules for the Navajo Tribal
Council." These new "Rules," however, were sufficient only for the elec-

tion of the new tribal council and executive officers. Furthermore, the
V> 1938 "Rules" did not define the scope or limits of the council's authority,

0

nor did the Navajo electorate have any say about the regulations.

16u Following these latest "Rules," the first election was held Sep106 P tember 24, 1938; Jacob C. Morgan was elected chairman and Howard
G Corman was chosen vice chairman. The first tribal council meeting
? was convened on November 8, 1938. The 1938 bylaws increased the
membership of the council to seventy-four delegates. The CIA lost the

right to appoint delegates, but the council meetings still required
the presence of a federal official, the superintendent, "who occupied a

position beside the chairman in the conduct of Council meetings."25
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The council, during the first meeting, chose not to bring forward

the executive committee. The delegates insisted that all decisions be
made by the full council. This was done in part because the previous
executive committee had approved the hated "grazing regulation." The

1938 "Rules for the Navajo Tribal Council," with important modifications to be discussed later, still constitute the basis for present-day
Navajo national government. Robert Young, in his work The Navajo Yearbook, pointed out that

There has been a growing tendency on the part of the federal government as well as that of the Tribe, to equate the

powers of the Council with those residual sovereign powers
remaining in the Tribe although the Tribe has never acted

formally to recognize the Council as the governmental organization authorized by the people to exercise those powers

in their behalf. (emphasis added)
DINt TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, 1940-1989

The 1938 "Rules" were amended several times during this

some important respects the current structure of the N

government remained subject to the influence of the In

ment. This is reflected in the fact that major amendmen

in the organization or election procedures still require ap
Secretary of the Interior.

During this half century, the Navajo Nation fully e

wage economy. The nation was also dramatically affecte

War II. Some 3,600 Navajos served in the military and n

worked in war-related activities. When this global conf

most of these Navajos returned to the reservation to f
sources and even fewer jobs. Their agitation about these

some Navajos to move permanently to cities in search of

Two other developments were of profound importa

1940s. In 1947, the tribal council established an advi

(formerly the executive committee) that, some say, ins

Navajo government. Also in 1947, the council entered in

with an attorney, Norman Littell, who was to oversee th

claims against the United States and the land conflicts

Nation, and who also provided general legal service

Three years later Congress stepped forward in an e

the economic suffering of the Navajo and Hopi peoples.

gress enacted the Navajo-Hopi Long-Range Rehabilitatio

funneled some $88 million to both tribes for a wide rang

aimed at economically and socially revitalizing both trib

ly, this measure also authorized the Navajo to adopt a c
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which, once written, would have to be ratified by the Navajo people.
Littell, aware of this provision even while the act was pending, soon
had written a draft constitution. In his own words the "constitution has

been drafted to give you, the Navajo Tribal Council and the Navajo
people, all the power I could get into that constitution under the law."26

The 1950s are referred to by some as the time when the Navajo

Nation was born. This is arguable, but it is certainly true that many
changes occurred that broadened the scope of Navajo government. It
represents an era, according to Peter Iverson,

When Navajo government leaders were engaged in broadening the scope and ambition of tribal government programs and reorganizing the structure of Navajo government in order to carry out these programs. The existence

of newly found revenue encouraged these leaders to involve the tribal government in unprecedented fashion ...
to improve the quality of Navajo life. Significant revision
of the government's organization included revival of the
chapter system and the expansion of the responsibilities of

the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.27
Let us return to the issue of a constitution. In 1953, a more fully

developed constitution was completed and sent to the CIA for review
and approval. Like the constitutional attempt in 1934, it also was simi-

lar to those of Indian Reorganization Act tribes who had approved
constitutions. However, several years of negotiating with BIA officials

convinced the tribal council that "under the language of the NavajoHopi Long-Range Rehabilitation Act, if the constitution is adopted, it
would strengthen the veto power of the Secretary rather than weaken
it."28 This fear of secretarial power would remain an obstacle to the ap-

proval of a constitution for a number of years, though ironically the
council's foundation itself continues to rest upon secretarial regulations

that give the Secretary of the Interior veto power over tribal ordi-

> nances in a number of major areas. Thus, the tribal council has continued to exercise a growing array of powers through resolutions that
remain subject to secretarial veto. In 1962 the tribe's resolutions were
codified into a tribal code modeled after federal codes. In a broad

u sense, the codified tribal code was the Navajo constitution, though it
108 has never been ratified by the tribal electorate.29
From 1962, when the tribal code was codified, until the civil unrest
in 1989, the Navajo government continued to expand in profound ways.
The availability of income, both from the federal government and from

the extraction of natural resources (i.e., timber, coal, oil, gas, uranium,
etc.), provided the tribal government with funds, however tenuous, that

enabled the tribe to exercise a growing measure of self-determination.
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The civil rights movement spawned the Great Society and the
War on Poverty programs of the federal government, which, taken together, increased the tribe's position nationally and internationally and

were also positive developments that facilitated growth within the na-

tion. For example, in 1965 the Navajo Tribal Council established the

Office of Navajo Economic Opportunity (ONEO), which received
federal funding from the Office of Economic Opportunity for neigh-

borhood youth corps programs, small business development, Head
Start programs, etc. Peter MacDonald, a future chairman, was the first

executive director of ONEO. Yet another Great Society program, the

Office of Navajo Economic Legal Aid and Defender Society (DNA),
was also established under ONEO. Peterson Zah, another future tribal
chairman/president, headed this organization for a period. Both Zah
and MacDonald used these important positions as springboards into
tribal leadership. Education also received the focused attention of the
tribal council, and in 1968 the council officially approved the establishment of Navajo Community College, the first tribally controlled
community college in the nation.
Peter MacDonald was elected chairman in 1970. He served three

consecutive terms before being defeated by Peterson Zah in 1982.

MacDonald was reelected in 1986. The MacDonald years began during the so-called Indian self-determination period, intended to allow
tribes greater political and economic freedoms to govern their own
lives and resources. MacDonald, the first university-educated chairman, was a dynamic speaker and was effective, particularly in his early
years, in attracting national attention and prestige to the nation. There

were also a number of impressive and startling changes in Navajo government structure with MacDonald amassing a tremendous amount of
power in the executive branch.
Reorganization of the tribal government consisted of two parts:

"the revision and alteration of the council committee system and the
restructuring of the tribal government framework. Through the first

part of reorganization, many new council standing committees became u

established; in addition, the chairman gained the power to appoint >
members to all standing committees."30 The 1971 reorganization also '

radically revised the executive branch of Navajo government. Five
0

central offices that dealt with business management, operations, etc., N

were each headed by a director appointed by MacDonald and serving u
at his pleasure. Interestingly, this massing of political power in the ex- s 109
ecutive branch and away from the legislative branch was approved by

the council with little apparent dissent. ?
MacDonald's second and third terms were, how

controversy. The chairman was indicted in 1977 on cha

agement of federal funds, and issues like apportionm

Hopi land dispute, the controversial creation of a s
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council in 1978, the tribal pension scheme in 1979, and MacDonald's
support of Ronald Reagan for president in 1980 only intensified concern over the state of his administration of the Navajo government.3'

Peterson Zah broke MacDonald's stranglehold on the chairman-

ship in 1982. Zah emphasized a partnership policy with the tribal
council, the Navajo people, and with the Hopi, local, state, and federal

governments. He also had active economic development initiatives,
pushed vigorously for the renegotiation of inequitable energy leases,
and stressed the importance of education of Navajo youth. In fact, education was his first priority, and very quickly the Navajo Tribal Council

adopted new educational policies for the tribe and reservation schools.32

Reapportionment and tribal government reform, however, were
two of the most important issues confronting the government. A new

reapportionment plan was finally adopted on December 6, 1985. And
in 1985 the Navajo Nation reorganized its court system through the
Judicial Reform Act. This measure created the Navajo Supreme Court
and revised the tribal court judge selection process.
Despite the stability Zah brought to the Navajo Nation, when his
term neared completion, MacDonald once again entered the picture. In

an extremely close election, MacDonald had 30,746 votes (carried 54
chapters) to Zah's 30,171 votes (carried 53 chapters); three chapters actually tied in their votes for the two. MacDonald was returned to power

and was sworn in on January 13, 1987. MacDonald's inaugural speech
seemed to indicate a man who had mellowed somewhat. He emphasized the need for jobs, talked about the importance of education, and,

like Zah, stressed partnerships with the business community and the
state governments. But he insisted that the Navajo people would continue to hold the federal government accountable as their trustee.

Very soon, however, developments began to spiral out of control.

First was the suppression of freedom of the press with the closing of
the tribe's newspaper, the Navajo Times Today, in February 1987. Second,

a special session of the Navajo Tribal Council, called for April 1987,
was killed because it lacked a quorum. The purpose of the session was
to have been tribal government reform. Third, MacDonald convinced
the tribal council to purchase the Big Boquillas Ranch just west of the
Grand Canyon. It was this final issue, the Big Bo deal, that would be at
the vortex of events that led to the 1989 riot in Window Rock in which

110 i

several Navajos were killed or injured.
N D DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE NAVAJO
?c NATION: TITLE II AMENDMENTS,

'"IQ 1989 TO PRESENT

By 1989 it was evident that while theo
a three-branch government, the actual
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executive branch, under MacDonald, was vastly superior to the legislative branch and, in fact, dominated the law-making branch. MacDonald
was chairman not of the Navajo Nation proper, but of the Navajo Tribal

Council. The office of the chair had accumulated vast powers, dating

back to the 1950s, an accumulation that grew tremendously under
MacDonald's reign.
The chairman by 1989 headed not only the executive branch,
but also held legislative powers greater than those exercised by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and was also the principal
representative of the tribe to the outside world. The chairman presided

over all meetings of the tribal council, selected all standing committee
chairs and members, including those of the powerful mini-council and
the Advisory Committee (which he chaired) that had authority to act

for the council when it was not in session. The Advisory Committee
also was empowered to develop an agenda for the council and could
recommend legislation. MacDonald also chaired the Intergovernmental Relations Committee.

The combination of this virtually unlimited executive power,
combined with the ample evidence uncovered in U.S. Senate hearings
from 1987 to 1989 of MacDonald's leading involvement in the tribe's
controversial purchase of the 491,000-acre Big Bo Ranch, in which he
was alleged to have accepted bribes and kickbacks from contractors,
led to an intense struggle for power in Window Rock. By early spring
1989, a majority of the tribal council had grown weary of these devel-

opments and placed MacDonald on involuntary administrative leave
pending the investigation of the allegations against him. Leonard Haskie

was appointed as interim chairman.

MacDonald and his supporters fought these actions over an
eleven-week period, despite the fact that the Navajo Supreme Court
had upheld the council's power to place a chairman on administrative
leave. The conflict eventually escalated into a deadly confrontation
that erupted in Window Rock on July 20, 1989, between MacDonald's

supporters and the tribal council and the tribal police. Two Navajos 3
died and ten others were injured in the fighting.33 >
In the fall of 1989 and in later trials, MacDonald was tried and

convicted on numerous counts of bribery, instigating a riot, frau

racketeering, ethics violations, extortion, and conspiracy. He was sentenced to fourteen years in a federal penitentiary. In December 1989,

the tribal council, urgently aware of the need to correct those structu

al problems in Navajo government that had fostered MacDonald's r

and maintenance of power, set about the task of restructuring the rela-

tionship between the executive and legislative branches.34
On December 15, 1989, by a vote of 44 to 17 with 13 abstentions, the Navajo Tribal Council enacted a landmark resolution, CD-

68-89, entitled "Amending Title Two (2) of the Navajo Tribal Code
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and Related Action." This law became operational April 11, 1990. The
opening section declares:
Whereas:

1. Pursuant to 2 N.T.C., Section 101, the Navajo
Tribal Council is the governing body of the Navajo

Nation; and
2. Recent controversy involving the leadership of

the Navajo Nation has demonstrated that the present
Navajo Nation Government structure allows too much
centralized power without real checks on the exercise of
power. Experience shows that this deficiency in the government structure allows for, invites and has resulted in

the abuse of power; and
3. The Judicial Branch has been reorganized by the
Judicial Reform Act of 1985 ... and treating the Judicial
Branch as a separate branch of government has proven to

be beneficial to the Navajo Nation and has provided stability in the government; and

4. The lack of definition of power and separation

of legislative and executive functions have also allowed
the legislative body to overly involve itself in administration of programs thereby demonstrating a need to limit

the legislative function to legislation and policy decision
making and further limit the executive function to imple-

mentation of laws and representation of the Navajo

Nation; and
5. There is an immediate need to reorganize the
Navajo Nation government by defining the powers of the
legislative and executive branches and impose limitations
on exercise of such powers; and
6. The number of standing committees of the

Navajo Tribal Council has grown to eighteen (18) and

some standing committees can be combined ... thereby
reducing the number of standing committees to twelve
%A (12) and to provide for a more efficient and responsive
committee system; and

;<^ ~ 7. The reorganization of the Navajo Nation
112 3 Government as proposed herein is intended to meet the
immediate needs of the Navajo people for a more responsible and accountable government and will have no effect
on the long term Government Reform Project which will
proceed as authorized and directed by the Navajo Tribal

Council; and
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8. It is in the best interest of the Navajo Nation that

the Navajo Nation Government be reorganized to provide
for separation of functions into three branches, and provide for checks and balances between the three branches

until the Navajo People decide through the Government
Reform Project the form of government they want to be
governed by.35

In effect, a number of impressive changes were implemented as a result
of this resolution:

* Formal separation of powers between the executive and
legislative branches.
* Diluted the power of the chief executive by creating the

office of Navajo Nation president and vice-president
who now served as the nation's chief executive officer.

The president no longer served as head of the legislative branch.

* Created a speaker of the council position. This individual presides over the council's deliberations.
* Defined and set limits on the powers of the executive
and legislative branches.
* Reduced the number of standing committees from eighteen to twelve.

* The power to appoint the membership of the legislative
committees was taken from the chairman/president and
given to the speaker of the council, subject to confirma-

tion by the council.

Despite these important and much needed reforms (see Figure 1 for a representation of the current government structure), the

Navajo people still were not given the opportunity to have any input

into these changes, and the Title Two Amendments have not yet ,
been taken before the Navajo electorate for their approval. In effect, >
even as the Navajo Nation government becomes more democrat-

ic, these changes lack fundamental political legitimacy because the
0
Navajo people have yet to sanction the government's existence in a ?
formal manner. Nevertheless, under the Title II Amendments, three u
Navajo presidents have so far been popularly elected (Zah in 1990, 3 113
Albert Hale in 1994, and Kelsey Begaye in 1998), although both Hale

and his immediate successor, Thomas Atcitty, were forced out of of- ?
fice for ethical improprieties. Still, the fact that they left office in a
peaceful fashion is a testimony to the stability of the current structure of government.
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NAVAJO NATION
THREE-BRANCH GOVERNMENT

EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL
BRANCH BRANCH BRANCH

Navajo Nation

Office of the Navajo
Office of the Navajo
Nation
Nation
President and
Speaker

Vice-President
Executive Offices

* Navajo Nation Washington
Office

* Navajo/Hopi Land
Commission

Supreme Court

* 88 Council Delegates

* Office of the Chief Justice

* Intergovernmental
Relations Committee

* Two Associate Justices

* Navajo Nation Council
Standing Committees
* Boards and Commission

District Courts

* Chinle District Court

* Crownpoint District Court

* Office of Navajo Tax
Commission

Legislative Offices

* Kayenta District Court
* Ramah District Court

* Office of Attorney General

* Office of Legislative
Services

* Tuba City District Court

* Office of Legislative

* Window Rock District

* Office of Management and
Budget

* Shiprock District Court

Counsel

Court

* Office of Auditor General
* Office of Ethics and Rules

* Navajo Election
* Division of Finance
* Division of Public Safety
* Division of Human
Resources

Administration

* Navajo Government

Development

* Division of General Services

Family Courts

* Navajo Labor Commission

* Chinle
* Canoncito

* Division of Education

* Office of Miss Navajo
Nation

* Crownpoint
* Alamo

* Division of Health Services

* Community Services

* Tuba City
* Window Rock

* Division of Social Services

Program

* Division of Community

* Legislative Personnel

Development
* Division of Economic

* Northern Navajo Agency

Development

* Shiprock
* Peacemaker Courts

Program

* Agency Network Program

Local Chapter Governments
3

-C

110 Navajo Nation Chapters

In December 1989, the Navajo Nation Council enacted Resolution CJA-72-89, which codified the separation of powers between the three branches.
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Source: Office of Navajo Government Development. Navajo Nation Government Booklet (Window
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Rock, Arizona: Office of Navajo Government Development, 1997), 18.
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Figure 1. Three-branch government of the Navajo Nation
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The Navajo Nation government, like al

nous governments, is confronted by a ba

push it hither and yon. We have already d
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Navajo Nation's relationship with the federal government; the nation's
struggle with democratization; and the political corruption scandals of

Chairman Peter MacDonald, which led to the latest surge of democratic reforms. But even this surge has not yet led to the ultimate step

in the process of democratization-when the Navajo policy makers
concede that the Navajo people are the legitimate fount of Navajo
sovereignty.

I will describe and discuss three of the ongoing public policies of

importance to the Navajo government-land disputes, gaming, and
taxation. Suffice it to say, there are many others, and entire texts could

be written about each of these. For example, a quick review of just the
most recent Navajo president's annual reports reveals discussion, com-

mentary, and concern about issues such as the rising tide of juvenile
crime, concerns about the quality and quantity of water, matters relat-

ing to Navajo education, the relationship of the nation to the states
and the federal government, eastern Navajo land consolidation, taxation matters, lack of quality housing, ongoing disputes-both land and

religious-with the Hopi Nation and the San Juan Band of Southern
Paiute, the rights of off-reservation Navajos, health care, economic de-

velopment, environmental issues around deforestation, coal and uranium extraction, etc., special problems of Navajo veterans, and concerns

about retention and application of traditional Navajo culture and philosophy. I have chosen to focus on three particular topics. The first, the

Navajo-Hopi land disputes, entails past, present, and future intertribal

possibilities. The second, Indian gaming, is a potential issue of great
economic and moral importance. The third, taxation, also has impor-

tant economic connotations, but also indicates that the nation has
evolved as a government into a more self-determined entity.
NAVAJO/HOPI LAND DISPUTES

Of the many issues confronting the Navajo go

ly be the one most recognized by parties ins

The disputes arise from an exceedingly co

with roots dating back to at least 1882, if n

involves not only the two tribal government

many other parties who have been involved

various agencies of the federal government,

rate interests, individual ranchers and lando

little discussed tribes-the San Juan Band o
Zuni Indians of New Mexico.

The conflicts have spawned countless feder

several congressional laws, many tribal resoluti

(the Navajo-Hopi Relocation Commission), and

break on the part of those Navajo and Hopi (ov
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and one hundred Hopi) who were required by federal law to relocate.
The relocation of members of both tribes constituted the largest relocation (forced for some, voluntary for others) of any racial/ethnic
group since the Japanese-American relocations during World War II. It
is also the most expensive Indian relocation, costing at least $330 mil-

lion by 1997. A wealth of literature36 has also been generated by the
conflicts between the tribes and others, though the reader is cautioned
to read material presented from both tribes' perspectives before draw-

ing any conclusions.

Background of the Disputes
Briefly, the issue is this. After the Navajo Reservation was created in
1868, a later Hopi Reservation, located southwest of the Navajo Reser-

vation, was established in 1882 through an executive order issued by
President Chester A. Arthur. This order set aside 2.5 million acres for

the Hopi and "such other Indians" the Secretary of the Interior might
see fit to settle there. As the Navajo population expanded, and with it

their land base, gradually the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation
came to engulf the Hopi Reservation, and Navajo people settled within the 1882 executive-order Hopi Reservation lands.
Even as this land conflict began to loom, another arose in 1934
when Congress added about 234,000 acres of land to the Navajo Reservation in the Western Agency. This acreage, just east of Tuba City,

happened to include the Hopi nation's westernmost village, Moencopi.
This time the language of the congressional act was the reverse of the
1882 executive order. The law stated that the land was for the benefit
of Navajos and "such other Indians as are already settled thereon." The

Hopi, however, claimed the entire area as compensation for Navajo
occupancy elsewhere within the 1882 Hopi Reservation.37
This formed the basis of what would become known as the
Bennett Freeze area, named after CIA Robert Bennett, who in 1966, at

the urging of Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, placed severe

> limitations on construction and development in the 1934 disputed
lands. Any future development would require the consent of both
tribes and all revenue from the land would go into a special account to
be held until the respective rights of both tribes could be determined.
The construction freeze has left an indelible mark on the over

116 seven hundred families living in the contested area. Although originally developed as "a means of encouraging negotiation over an age-old
dispute ... the Bennett Freeze gradually developed into an intrusive
and burdensome policy ... forcing [the Indians] to live in poverty by
denying them the right to enlarge, to maintain, and even to repair their
homes."38

The construction ban was temporarily lifted in 1992 by federal
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judge Earl Carroll. It was reinstated before it was again lifted in 1996
after the two tribes reached an agreement. However, the freeze re-

mained on some 700,000 acres the Hopi Nation claims. Congress
got involved when Representative John D. Hayworth introduced H.R.
104 on January 6, 2001, which would legislatively repeal the Bennett
Freeze, ending what Hayworth called "a gross treaty violation with the

Navajo Nation." As of this writing (fall 2001), this bill had not been
enacted.

The land problems between the two tribal nations festered
throughout the middle part of the twentieth century. Delicate negotiations between the tribal councils and their attorneys failed, and a court

settlement, which called for joint use and occupancy by the two tribes,

also failed to resolve the profound differences between the Navajo and
Hopi governments. The Hopi, for their part, demanded a partition of
the 1882 reservation that would clarify and affirm their land rights.
The Navajo Nation, for its part, wanted its members to be able to remain where they were in the disputed area and preferred buying out
the Hopi Nation's interests.

Congress responded in 1974 with P.L. 93-541,39 which provided
for partition-a fifty-fifty division of the 1.8 million acres of landbetween the two tribes. An independent, temporary relocation commission was established by the law to oversee the relocation of the affected tribal members who, after land division, were found to be on the

"wrong side of the line." Houses and relocation expenses were to be
provided by the federal government. Relocation was scheduled to be
completed by 1986.
Human conflicts like this that include issues of property rights
(land, livestock, water, coal), religious freedom concerns (access to sa-

cred shrines and eagle gathering areas and use of eagle parts), corporate involvement, and the psychological, emotional, and formal disruptions and violence they generate, rarely conform to governmental

timetables. Although the vast majority of Navajos and all Hopis have
been relocated, the process, as of 2001, is not yet complete. The incompletion stems from the persistent resistance of some two to three
hundred Navajos (the figures vary) who refuse to leave the lands they
feel culturally and religiously connected to: lands that the Hopi Nation

has legally owned since 1882 and has been spiritually and culturally
linked with for many more centuries.

The fierce resistance of this group of Navajo led Congress in the 3 117
fall of 1996 to enact yet another law, P.L. 104-301, the Navajo-Hopi
Land Dispute Settlement Act, which implemented the Accommodation
Agreement that had been worked out over the previous five years. The

Land Dispute Act ratified the settlement of four claims of the Hopi
nation against the federal government and provided the necessary authority for the Hopi to exercise jurisdiction over their lands by issuing
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seventy-five-year lease agreements to the Navajos still residing on

Hopi-partitioned lands. The Hopi are to be paid $50 million by the
United States for lost rents and to enable the tribe to buy new lands.40

The Navajo Nation Council had already enacted resolutions in

1994 and 1995 that opposed the Accommodation Agreement in its
original form because, according to the nation, it did not protect the
religious rights of the Navajo residents. While morally opposed to relocation, then president Albert Hale noted in a speech on February 1,

1997, that changes in the Accommodation Agreement, implemented
with the passage of Public Law 104-301 in 1996, spearheaded by the
Navajo residents themselves, guaranteed them religious protection. As
such, he declared that "this agreement represents the only remaining

means to establish their legal basis for continued residency on Hopi
Partitioned Lands. Will they accept what their fellow Navajo neigh-

bors have negotiated? I submit to all my people: the Navajo Hopi
Partition Lands residents should sign the Accommodation Agreement."

The council, however, in a special session later in February, reaffirmed its earlier resolution "opposing the Accommodation Agree-

ment in its present form" and recommended an extension of the
March 31, 1997, deadline. The council also expressed "adamant opposition" to forced eviction of Navajos.41 Navajo residents were given
until March 31, 1997, to sign the seventy-five-year leases (renewable
for another seventy-five years) with the Hopi Nation, although the
ones who refused to sign were not evicted immediately. If they agreed
to relocate, the federal government was required under the 1996 law to

pay for their moving expenses and build them a home, a process that
takes anywhere from six months to more than a year.
NAVAJOS AND TRIBALLY SPONSORED

GAMBLING (GAMING)

Since the 1980s, many tribal governments have in

gambling as a means to generate revenue to offse

> creased federal funding and to develop their own

fact, tribes were encouraged by the Reagan admin

tribally owned Indian gambling enterprises as one
balancing the severe cuts in federal expenditures

had implemented. After an important Supreme Cou

118 I California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,42 whic

not enforce their civil/regulatory gaming laws to

Indian lands, Congress stepped forward the follow
ed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).43

This act had three broad goals: to promote tri

velopment, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal gove

regulatory base to protect Indian gaming from org

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 22 Oct 2019 16:31:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

establish a National Indian Gaming Commission. The act separated
Indian gaming into three classes. Class I was strictly social gambling
and solely under tribal jurisdiction. Class II included bingo, pull tabs,
etc. This type was subject to tribal jurisdiction, with federal oversight.
It also had to be legal under existing state law. Class III, potentially the
most lucrative, included keno, lottery, pari-mutuel, slot machines, casi-

no games, and banking card games. This class required a tribal ordinance, permission from the Indian Gaming Commission, and the state
had to permit the activity. In fact, tribes were required to conduct Class

III gaming in conformance with a tribal-state compact. If a state, such

as Utah, did not allow Class III gaming, then tribes were denied the
chance to engage in it.
States were required under the act to make a "good faith" effort

to negotiate a tribal-state compact with those tribes who wanted to
pursue these gaming ventures. The act authorized a tribe to bring suit
in federal court against a state in order to force performance of that
duty if the state refused to act in good faith and in good time to work

out a compact. This final provision, however, was changed when the
Supreme Court ruled in Seminole Tribe of Indians v. Florida44 in 1996 that

the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution prevents Congress from
authorizing suits by tribes against states absent state consent.
In fact, the IGRA gave states a voice, for the first time, over inter-

nal economic issues that previously were left solely to the discretion of

the tribes and their trustee, the federal government. The requirement
that tribes have to negotiate a compact with a state for Class III gaming

operations, in effect, provided state officials with powerful leverage
over a tribal nation's internal economic decisions.

States, with only a few exceptions (e.g., General Allotment Act
of 1887, Public Law 280 of 1953, terminated tribes), have rarely had
any direct say, much less veto power, over internal tribal decisions.
Several reasons account for this. First, the doctrine of tribal sovereign-

ty recognizes the right of tribal nations to manage their own affairs

without state interference. Second, the nation-to-nation treaty rela-

tionship that states were precluded from participating in provides >
tribes a measure of protection from state intrusion. And third, many

western states-including Arizona and New Mexico-were required '
to insert "disclaimer" clauses in their constitutions in which they assured the federal government that they would never attempt to inter-

fere in tribal affairs and would never attempt to tax Indian trust lands. ? 119
Despite this wealth of protection, however, the ideology of states' rights

activism has grown tremendously in the last ten years, and Congress
and the Supreme Court are more often siding with states when they are

competing with tribes.

For some tribes, such as the Mashantucket Pequot of Connecticut, the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians of California, or the Ak-Chin
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Community of Arizona, Indian gaming, as the business has come to be

called, has brought billions of dollars, provided jobs for tribal members, and generally enabled the successful tribes to attain a level of eco-

nomic self-sufficiency they had not enjoyed since before the days of
European colonialism. Indian gaming has generated jobs, revenues, and
other economic benefits to local and state economies as well.

For other tribes, however, such as the Mohawk and Oneida of
New York, while gaming has generated significant revenue, it has also

led to severe intratribal tension, sometimes leading to violence, and
has produced other negative social consequences as well. More important, it has generated a severe backlash in many state governments and

among more established gambling interests in Las Vegas and New
Jersey. States and the players in Vegas and Jersey are envious of the

riches-both actual and perceived-that tribes are enjoying. The backlash has worked its way into Congress where bills are pending that
would reduce the tribes' gaming options, and into the Supreme Court
where recent decisions have restricted the sovereignty of tribes while
uplifting the sovereign powers of states.45

As of 2001, 196 of the 561 tribal entities were operating 309
gaming facilities in twenty-eight states. In Arizona alone, 17 tribal
nations have gaming operations, including Cocopah, Fort McDowell
Mohave-Apache, Gila River, Hualapai, San Carlos and White Mountain
Apache, the Pascua Yaqui, etc. The Fort McDowell tribe, for example,
in 1993 announced profits of $41 million, which was split thus: $12.3
million for tribal government operations; $15.6 for economic development; $2 million for community welfare; $410,000 for contracts with

local governments; $410,000 for local charity; and $10.3 million for
per capita (individual) payments to tribal members-averaging about
$12,000 per person.46 The only tribes in Arizona that do not have gam-

ing as of 2001 are the Havasupai, Hopi, San Juan Southern Paiute, and

the Navajo Nation.47

3 Navajos Reject Gaming

' Historically, Navajos, like most social groups, enjoyed a number of in

formal gambling rituals. For example, the shoe game is still very po

lar, and certainly gambling was done on horse and foot races. Card

u games were and still are played quite frequently at squaw dances

120 3 other gatherings.48 This type of gambling is very different from th

N type of state or tribally sanctioned gaming that is backed by the fo

? of law and is designed to generate revenue for governmental purpos

From a governmental perspective, the Navajo Nation passed a re
0 lution in 1977 that criminalized gambling if the person engagin

it "intends to derive an economic benefit other than personal win

nings" from the endeavor. However, seemingly in anticipation of tri
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sponsored gambling, this law was amended in 1993 by providing an
"exception" to the offense section. Resolution CN-81-93 declared that
"it shall not be unlawful for any person to engage in the activities con-

stituting this offense if done as part of an economic initiative of the

Navajo Nation Government, or as a gaming licensee of the Navajo
Nation Government."49 In a footnote to this law, it was stated that
the effective date of this amendment was "subject to enactments of a
comprehensive statutory scheme to control gaming within the Navajo

Nation by the Navajo Nation Council."
Despite the council's optimism, however, and with so many tribes

having already ventured into gaming as a prime economic generator, why has the Navajo Nation not joined in the process? More specifi-

cally, why has the Navajo Nation electorate, in two separate tribal

referenda-1994 and 1997-explicitly rejected the establishment of
Indian gaming within the reservation?

According to research conducted by Henderson and Russell, the
Navajo people rejected the gaming referendum in November 1994 by
a vote of 23,450 to 23,073 largely because of moral concerns. It appears that these concerns outweighed the perceived potential for reve-

nue because "unlike other tribal casinos which generally attract predominantly non-Indian patrons, the proposed casinos in the Navajo
Nation would be patronized by large numbers of Navajos."50 Not easi-

ly dissuaded, the council pushed forward and in 1997 authorized yet
another national referendum by Resolution CAP-26-97 during the spring

session. Once again, Navajos rejected the measure. While no scientific
research has been done on the second referendum, in all likelihood
the Navajo turned away from gaming for reasons similar to those in
1994-concern about the social welfare of tribal members. As Richie

Nez, executive director of the Navajo Election Administration put it:
"No matter how you educate people, especially the older people, they
still associate gambling with alcoholism, and all other vices ... They
just don't see any good coming out of it."51

This issue pits the general social and moral concerns of the
Navajo electorate against the financial and economic concerns of a majority of those in the government who believe that the nation is losing

out on millions of dollars and thousands of permanent jobs. Gaming is

an issue that promises to be revisited yet again in the future by the
council and by the nation.

An interesting question is, why has the council twice placed this 121
issue before the people using the referendum process, yet refused to
put the question of a tribal constitution, or one of the proposed alternative government ideas, or even the Title II amendments before the
people for their consideration? Certainly, economic considerations are
vitally important to the nation as their nonrenewable natural resource

endowment (especially coal, gas, etc.) continues to decline, which
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directly reduces the revenues coming into the tribal treasury. But the
question of governmental legitimacy, from the standpoint of what con-

stitutes the actual basis of tribal sovereignty, is, one could argue, even
more vital to the character of the nation.
TAXATION AND THE NAVAJO NATION

Euro-Americans and taxes have coexiste

ginning of the American republic. "Tax

after all, was one of the catalysts spar

since American colonists resented the i

to a distant government, Great Britain

sentation in. Americans then and now,

as Chief Justice John Marshall stated in

that "the power to tax involves the po
anyone holding a job is aware, because

truthfulness of the famous expression

said to be certain, except death and tax

But taxes are also the lifeblood of m

and are becoming increasingly import

well. Taxes raise the revenues required

sential services (libraries, roads, schoo

ment affairs. Of course, taxation, like

cussing, touches Indian lives and reserv

than it touches other Americans. For

in the section describing how U.S. rep

to Congress, required each state, when

poses of congressional apportionment,

This same expression is also found i

Amendment, which was ratified and p
sion was included because Indians were not citizens of the United

States when the Constitution was drafted, and most had still not been
enfranchised as late as the 1860s when the Fourteenth Amendment was

> ratified. Indians remained citizens of their own sovereign nations.

Ug The passage of several laws, including the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, altered the status of individual Indians vis-a-vis federal taxes.
And after some court cases in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, it was determined by the federal government that individual Indians, as citizens

122 of the United States, were indeed required to pay federal income taxes
unless a treaty or statute exempted them.52

Tribal governments, however, as sovereign entities, are generally
exempt from paying most federal taxes and nearly all state taxes. In fact,

the Internal Revenue Service has determined specifically that tribes are
exempt from federal income taxes. But the immunity from some taxation that tribes have is not nearly as secure as the immunity states enjoy
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from federal taxation. Tribes periodically face concerted attempts by
certain state and federal legislators to require them to pay taxes, not-

withstanding tribal sovereign status. States do not face such taxation
assaults by the federal government.

The Power of the Navajo Nation to Tax
Until the 1970s, the Navajo Nation did not collect taxes to finance its
operations, although as we have shown, the nation was clearly entitled

to collect taxes. Ironically, while the nation was not collecting taxes,
state governments were using their taxing authority and were earning

sizable sums of money by taxing certain businesses operating within
Navajo lands. In fact, in a study done by Michael Benson in 1975, he

learned that besides paying applicable federal taxes, Navajos were
also paying taxes to support the state governments of Arizona, New
Mexico, and Utah. They were also contributing to six county governments in those three states-Apache, Coconino, and Navajo in Arizona;
Mckinley and San Juan in New Mexico, and San Juan in Utah. Benson
further noted that:

State and county governments collect taxes on property
located in the Navajo Nation and on income derived from

activities in the Navajo Nation. They directly tax the incomes and property of non-Navajos who live, work or
conduct business in the Navajo Nation. They collect a lot

of taxes "indirectly" from Navajos and non-Navajos by
taxing wholesalers who supply Navajo Nation retailers
with such commodities as gasoline and cigarettes.53
What was particularly frustrating, as this report showed, was that

non-Navajo governments were receiving far more money in taxes from

the development of Navajo Nation resources than the Navajo Nation

was securing in income from royalties and lease arrangements from

those same resources. For example, in 1972 the Navajo Nation re- >
ceived $1.4 million in royalties for the coal that was used at the Four
Corners Power Plant. By contrast, the state, county, and local govern-

ments were earning $7.2 million from taxes on that same coal.54 ?
As a result of this kind of disparity, and with the growing realiza- u

tion that the nation's mineral resources were not inexhaustible, the
Navajo government in 1974 enacted a resolution establishing a Navajo

Tax Commission. The MacDonald administration was slow in getting
the commission started, but it was eventually set up and began the pro-

cess of devising a taxation program to correct the evident taxation inequities. The commission's work led to two tribally approved tax ordi-

nances in 1984: a Possessory Interest Tax and a Business Activity Tax.

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 22 Oct 2019 16:31:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

The taxes were immediately challenged by individuals and companies
subject to them, although, as noted earlier, one of the inherent powers

of any sovereign is the power to tax. Tribal governments, therefore,

have the legal right to tax their citizens, noncitizens, and businesses
and corporations doing business within their lands. As the Supreme
Court said in 1982 in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe:

The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sov-

ereignty because it is a necessary instrument of selfgovernment and territorial management. This power enables a tribal government to raise revenues for its essential

services. The power does not derive solely from the Indian
tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction,

and to defray the cost of providing governmental services
by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises en-

gaged in economic activities within that jurisdiction.55

Notwithstanding this important decision, the Navajo Nation
taxes continued to be challenged by companies like the Kerr-McGee
Corporation. Ultimately, in 1985, the Supreme Court ruled in KerrMcGee Corporation v. The Navajo Tribe56 that the nation possessed the sov-

ereign power to enact and impose tax laws without approval by the
Interior Department.57

The Possessory Interest Tax (PIT) requires any owner of a lease
granted by the Navajos to pay an annual tax on the value of the lease
site and natural resources thereunder at a rate of between 1 and 10 per-

cent. The Business Activity Tax (BAT) requires anyone who is engaged

in production activities on the reservation to pay a tax on the gross
receipt from such activities at a rate of between 4 and 8 percent. Both

ordinances have been amended several times, and other taxes have
since been enacted as well.

> In 1985 the council established an Oil and Gas Severance Tax, a
tax imposed on the severance of, producing, or taking from the soil
products within the nation at the rate of between 3 and 8 percent. In

addition, in 1992 the council created a Hotel Occupancy Tax that "imu posed on a person who, under a lease, concession, permit ... pays for
124 3 the use or possession or for the right to the use or possession of a room
or space in a hotel costing $2 or more each day." The tax rate initially

? was 5 percent, but in 1994 it was increased to 8 percent. This tax
was also challenged by non-Indians. In May 2001, in a landmark ruling
that dramatically infringed on Navajo (and by extension other tribal
nations) sovereignty, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley (531 U.S. 645), the

U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that since the Navajo's Hotel
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Occupancy Tax had not been authorized via treaty or congressional
statute, and since it fell upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land-

even though the business was operated within the borders of the
reservation-the Navajo Nation could not lawfully impose the tax.
The council, in 1995, instituted two new measures to generate
revenue for the tribal coffers: a Tobacco Products Tax and Licensing Act

(a 40 cents per pack tax is assessed on tobacco sales) and a Fuel Distributors Licensing Act (taxing any person or business delivering fuel
on the reservation). The Tax Commission is also in the early stages of

discussing the need for a Gross Receipts Tax, which if ever enacted
would impose on the gross receipts of any person engaged in trade,
commerce, manufacture, power production, or any other productive
activity a tax at a heretofore unspecified rate. This tax would exempt

the sale of gasoline, church-sponsored activities, prescription drugs,
wages, food stamps, etc.58

These taxes and license fees generate an average of $30 million a
year for tribal government operations, although this figure will be reduced in the wake of the Atkinson ruling. The BAT brings in $15 million;

the PIT $10 million; the Oil and Gas Severance Tax about $4 million;
the Hotel Occupancy Tax about $1 million. The remainder comes in
from the tobacco and fuel taxes.59

Importantly, the taxes are imposed on Navajo citizens as well as

particular non-Navajo business activities, although the Navajo Nation
itself is exempt from being taxed. As the amount of nonrenewable re-

sources continues to decrease, taxation and the revenues it produces
will become even more important to the nation's economy.
CONCLUSION

If this sampling of policy issues is any indica

holds for the Navajo Nation government,

Navajo people and their elected and appointe

future, as they did a past and present, that

tension. Promise because, as we have seen, th

larly adept at finding creative ways of taking

resources, and managing their affairs with o

because internal conflicts, a gradually dimini

sources, and the inconsistent nature of Nava

counties, states, and the federal governmen

mony is not likely. This is understandable. Bu

ward full democracy, which intensified with
of 1989, means that the nation is heading in

Of course, the Navajo people have still no

taken the opportunity via a referendum/init

lective will about what shape Dine democrac
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must be rectified. But even after this is accomplished, assuming that
it will be, everything will not be settled. Democracies, no matter their

location, are not perfect governments. It is up to successive Navajo

generations to nurture and strengthen the foundation of Navajo
government.

Perhaps former Chief Justice Tom Tso put it best when asked by

a reporter as he neared retirement what he thought his primary con-

tributions to the Navajo court system had been. Tso responded by
saying:
I don't know if I've done anything extraordinary. Basically,

I did my job, which was to hear and to cite cases-giving
everybody a fair shake. I've tried to be very fair about the

procedures and to make decisions based on the facts and
the laws. I guess what I am trying to say is, that during all
of my years on the bench, I just tried to do what a judge

should be doing. There is no significant magic. I've had a
lot of resources and a lot of cooperation from the leadership and the staff and we just did our jobs. We tried to look

to Navajo customs, tradition and culture, and we found
that many of our decisions and laws were influenced by
those traditions.60

This statement by a highly respected Navajo jurist exemplifies the
strength, hindsight, and foresight of the Dine spirit that entails coop-

erative living; respect for tradition, culture, and language; a focus on
fairness and integrity; and the pursuit of justice.
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